

# Towards a uniform super-linguistic theory of projection

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## Summary

**Question:** how should we approach secondary modality content like gestures, facial expressions, intonational morphemes?

**Answer:** as bona fide linguistic objects across the board


**Case studies:** conventionalized gestures and misc degree modifiers

## Background

Recent literature focused on projection of non-conventionalized gestures (Ebert & Ebert 2014; Hunter 2018; Schlenker 2018a, a.o.):



- (1) a. Lea might bring  her dog<sub>LARGE</sub>.  
→ Lea's dog is large.



- b. Zoe might  shoot at the target<sub>LONGBOW</sub>.  
→ If Zoe shoots, she'll shoot a longbow.

**Common assumption:** modality-specific rules for projection

**Schlenker 2018b:** predict if/how “iconic enrichments” project from:

- whether they are “internal” or “external” (“eliminable” or not)
  - whether they co-occur w/something in a more primary modality
- So, gestures in (1) are “external” and co-speech → “cosuppositions”

## A super-linguistic approach

**Esipova 2019:** the same principles guide projection in all modalities

- Architectural assumptions:  $\lambda$  model, late vocabulary insertion
- Projection pattern determined by how  $X$  composes, not how it's expounded; modality effects only in phonology and pragmatics
- E.g., gestures in (1) can be construed as:
  - **(subjective) modifiers** (*LARGE*  $\approx$  *large*):  $\langle \tau, \tau \rangle$ ; pragmatically project if non-restricting (truth-conditionally vacuous—Leffel 2014, adjusted) + prefer to be non-restricting if co-speech; cf. (2)
  - **supplements** (*LARGE*  $\approx$  *a large object*): pass input unchanged + conventionally projecting proposition (e.g., Potts 2005); cf. (3)

- (2) a. If Lea brings her lovely dog, I'll stay.  
→ If Lea brings her dog, I'll stay. TC vacuity  
→ Lea's dog is lovely. NRM inference (“cosupposition”)  
b. If Lea brings her **lovely** dog, not her **nasty** one, I'll stay.

- (3) a. If Lea brings her dog, (who's) a lovely creature, I'll stay.  
→ Lea's dog is a lovely creature  
b.  $\#_{(PrP)}$  If Lea brings her dog),  $(PrP)$  (who's) a **lovely** creature),  $(PrP)$  not her dog),  $(PrP)$  (who's) a **nasty** creature),  $(PrP)$  I'll stay).  
 $\neq$  (2b);  $\neq$  If [Lea brings her dog and it's a lovely creature]...

Non-conventionalized gestures rely on iconicity to convey meaning  
→ constrained, usually subjective modifiers → confirmation bias


Need to look at a **wider range** of meaning types!

## Conventionalized gestures


Conventionalized gestures can be:

- **subjective modifiers**; project pragmatically if non-restricting:



- (4) a. If you bring  a semanticist<sub>CRAZY</sub>, I'll fight with them.  
→ If you bring a semanticist, I'll fight with them.  
→ All semanticists are crazy.



- b. If we wanna  celebrate<sub>DRINK</sub>, let's go to a store now.  
→ If we wanna celebrate, let's go to a store now.  
→ If we celebrate, we'll do so by drinking alcohol.


- (5) a. ?If Kim brings her brother<sub>CRAZY</sub>, I'll fight with him, but if she brings her **normal** brother, that's OK.  
 $\approx$  If Kim brings her **crazy** brother...  
b. ?If we wanna **celebrate**<sub>DRINK</sub>, let's go to a store now, but, of course, we can also celebrate **without** alcohol.  
 $\approx$  If we wanna celebrate by drinking **alcohol**...


- **non-subjective modifiers**; not TC vacuous:



- (6) Kim is bringing her  friend<sub>AIR-QUOTES</sub>.  
 $\approx$  Kim is bringing her {so-called, quote-unquote} friend.  
 $\nrightarrow$  Kim is bringing her friend.

- **supplements**; project conventionally:



- (7) If  a friend of mine wins<sub>FINGERS-CROSSED</sub>, I'll be happy.  
 $\approx$  If a friend of mine, {hopefully, fingers crossed}, wins...  
→ I want a friend of mine to win.  
 $\neq$  If [a friend of mine wins and I wanted them to]...

Schlenker's (2018b) typology can't capture this diverse behavior of co-speech gestures. Exclude all conventionalized gestures?

- A principled way to identify them? Is it a binary distinction even?
- Would miss the parallels across modifier gestures

Can't avoid making **linguistic** distinctions!

## Conclusion

- No need for a modality-specific typology of projection patterns
- Make other typologies of meaning-bearing expressions cross-modal, e.g.: attitudinal/expressive content; “parasitic” expressions that don't integrate compositionally with their hosts, etc.

## Selected references

Ebert & Ebert. 2014. *SPE* 7. Leffel. 2014. PhD thesis. Esipova. 2019. PhD thesis. Hunter. 2018. *L&P*. Ghomeshi et al. 2004. *NLLT*. Kennedy & McNally. 2005. *Language*. Potts. 2005. OUP. Schlenker. 2018a. *L&P*; 2018b. *NLLT*.

## Degree modifiers cross-modally

Open-scale degree modifiers are persistently restricting by default:

- **primary modality degree modifiers**

- adverbs and re-lexicalized expressives:

- (8) If the movie's {very, extremely, truly, surprisingly, fucking, bloody, damn} good, I'll stay till the end of the credits.  
 $\nrightarrow$  If the movie's good, I'll stay till the end of the credits.

- modifier repetition with a gradient iconic effect:

- (9) a. You are a sick, sick man. (Ghomeshi et al. 2004, fn. 3)  
b. The movie's very, very, very good.

- “contrastive reduplication”:

- (10) a. I'm up, I'm just not **up-up**. (Ghomeshi et al. 2004, (1d))  
b. Lea doesn't have a chihuahua, she has a **dog-dog**.

- **suprasegmental degree modification**

- *DEG-INT* morpheme (preliminarily:  $L^*+H$ , syllable lengthening, higher intensity, creaky phonation):


- (11) a. The movie's good<sub>DEG-INT</sub>.  $\approx$  very good  
b. Lea has a dog<sub>DEG-INT</sub>.  $\approx$  big dog, or proper dog  
c. I ran<sub>DEG-INT</sub>.  $\approx$  ran fast, or ran properly


- extra lengthening:

- (12) a. The lecture was {looong, #shooort}. (Schlenker 2018b)  
b. It's {slow<sub>DEG-INT</sub>, sloooow<sub>DEG-INT</sub>, fast<sub>DEG-INT</sub>, #faaast<sub>DEG-INT</sub>}.

- **degree modification via facial expressions**

- OO can be a supplement or a degree modifier (cf. *surprisingly*):



- (13) a.   $[[\text{Mia got DRUNK}]^{OO}]$ .  
 $\approx$  It's surprising that Mia got drunk.  
b. Mia got  $[[\text{DRUNK}]^{OO}]$ .  
 $\approx$  Mia got drunk to a {surprising, high} extent.  
c. If a friend of mine gets DRUNK, I won't say anything, but if  $[[\text{a friend of mine gets DRUNK}]^{OO}]$ , I will.  
 $\neq$  If [a friend of mine gets drunk and I'm surprised by it]...

Schlenker's (2018b) typology:

- can't predict the variable behavior of OO
- says lengthening in (12) is “internal” and w/o own time slot → can be at-issue; misses the cross-modal generalization above

**Uniform degree modifier semantics**

- Kennedy & McNally 2005, but with the  $\exists$ -closure separated out
- Degree modifiers cross-modally expone the head of a DegP
- Non-scalar predicates type-shift when combining with DegPs
- Extra iconic effects (as in (9), (12)) uncaptured so far

- (14) a.  $[[\text{DEG}]](\llbracket \alpha \langle d, \langle \tau_1 \dots \tau_n, st \rangle \rangle \rrbracket) = \lambda d \lambda X \lambda X^1 \dots X^n \lambda w. \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket(d)(X^1) \dots (X^n)(w) \wedge \text{deg}(d)(w)$   
b.  $[[\text{dog}_{\text{DEG-INT}}]] = \llbracket \exists d \rrbracket(\llbracket \text{DEG-INT} \rrbracket(\llbracket \text{SCALAR} \rrbracket(\llbracket \text{dog} \rrbracket))) = \lambda x \lambda w. \exists d [\text{scale}_{\text{dog}}(x)(w) = d \wedge \text{high}(d)(w)]$